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Charlotte's Web: Reflections on the Role of Due
Process in Academic Decisionmaking
A woman was admitted to the University of Missouri-Kansas City
Medical School in 1971; in the spring of her final year, "just weeks before
her class was to graduate,"' she was dismissed from the school for
academic performance deficiencies.2 The student, Charlotte Horowitz, was
barred from the conferences leading to her expulsion and was not allow-
ed to present evidence or arguments in her defense.' Horowitz challeng-
ed her dismissal in federal court,4 initiating a sequence of hearings which
Brief for Respondent at 1, Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
2 Brief for Petitioners at 13, Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
3 Brief for Respondent, supra note 1, at 3. Horowitz had been admitted to the Medical
School's unusual three-year program as an advanced standing student; her advanced place-
ment was a result both of her "outstanding scholastic credentials, including a bachelor's
degree in chemistry from Barnard College, a master's degree in psychology from Columbia
University, and graduate work at Duke University and the National Institutes of Health,"
and of laudatory "recommendations from people who were familiar and impressed with her
work." Id. at 1-2. Horowitz' first-year performance, a year "equivalent to the third year
in a traditional four-year school," was satisfactory enough for her docent to rate her "above
average in all respects." Id. at 3. However, by the fall of 1972 she was placed on academic
probation for unsatisfactory performance in "patient-oriented settings." Id. at 8. Her per-
formance in this area continued to distress the faculty and eventually, after a series of evalua-
tions, she was dismissed for failure in "clinical competence, peer-and patient relations, per-
sonal hygiene, and ability to accept criticism." Brief for Petitioners, supra note 2, at 7. For
a more extensive description of the sequence of events leading to the dismissal, see
Rosenberg, The Horowitz Affair, 58 B.U. L. REv. 733 (1978).
' The case was first heard by the United States District Court for the Western District
of Missouri, which in an unreported decision upheld the dismissal. Horowitz v. Curators
of the Univ. of Mo., No. 74CV47-W-3 (W.D. Mo., filed Nov. 14, 1975). The Eighth Circuit
reversed, finding that by virtue of the fact that such a dismissal stigmatized her and damaged
her medical career, Horowitz had been entitled to a notice of charges and a hearing at which
to respond to those charges. Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 538 F.2d 1317 (8th Cir. 1976).
After a petition for rehearing en banc was denied, 542 F.2d 1335 (8th Cir. 1976), the Supreme
Court granted certiorari, 430 U.S. 964 (1977). Horowitz' argument, before the Supreme Court
and elsewhere, was that "faculty, staff and examiners" at the school were prejudiced against
her because she was Jewish, female and, at least according to medical school standards,
quite unkempt. Brief for Respondent, supra note 1, at 14-15. She felt that, because of this
prejudice, she was held to "higher standards of performance" than were other students
and that, had she been given a hearing, she would have been able to present evidence that
her dismissal was not warranted. Id. at 16-45.
The Medical School at the University of Missouri-Kansas City has an "Academic Plan"
which contains the "rules, regulations, policies and procedures" used in educating its students.
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 2, at 4. The document establishes a Council on Evaluation,
composed of faculty and students, which periodically evaluates the performance of every
student. Id. Recommendations of the Council are reviewed by the Coordinating Commit-
tee, which is composed exclusively of faculty, and must also be approved by the dean of
the school before being put into effect. "The rules, regulations, policies and procedures do
not grant to a student the right to a notice of charges and hearing before the Council or
Committee wherein an evaluation is being made of the student's overall academic perfor-
mance and status in the School of Medicine." Id.
Horowitz was originally placed on probation and informed that she must make "very
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finally culminated in the Supreme Court's ruling, in Board of Curators
v. Horowitz,5 that:
The decision to dismiss respondent ... rested on the academic judg-
ment ... that she did not have the necessary clinical ability to per-
form adequately as a medical doctor and was making insufficient pro-
gress toward that goal .... Like the decision of an individual pro-
fessor as to the proper grade for a student in his course, the deter-
mination whether to dismiss a student for academic reasons requires
an expert evaluation of cumulative information and is not readily
adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative
decisionmaking6
This note is not concerned with Horowitz' unhappy career; it is con-
cerned with the doctrine of "academic abstention," which provided the
basis for the Supreme Court's deference to the medical school's evaluation.7
marked and very substantial improvement" in several clinical skills areas. Id. at 8. She
elected, and was allowed, to undergo examinations by seven local practicing physicians as
a form of appeals procedure. Id. at 9. The panel of physicians was divided in its recommen-
dations, but after receiving its report the Council recommended that absent "radical im-
provement" Horowitz should be dropped. Several months later the Council met again, review-
ed Horowitz' performance in the interim, and unamimously voted that she be dropped; the
Coordinating Committee and the dean agreed, and the decision was affirmed by the Univer-
sity's Provost for Health Sciences. Brief for Respondent, supra note 1, at 9-11.
5 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
6 Id. at 89-90.
See generally H. EDWARDS & V. NORDIN, HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE LAW 14 (1979).
Although the doctrine is applied at all educational levels, this note addresses only academic
evaluations in graduate and professional schools. This limitation is dictated by several fac-
tors. Perhaps the least important of these is manageability: the policy and doctrinal con-
siderations are so disparate at the different educational levels that it would be impossible
to do justice to all in a note of this length. Also, the academic tenure of students in the
first 12 grades of public school is protected as a "statutory entitlement." Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565, 572 (1975). Given this protection, academic dismissals are both less frequent
and less problematic at this level. Additionally, students at the undergraduate level are
more likely to be the beneficiaries of departmental or collegial review procedures. See, e.g.,
Procedures of the Academic Fairness Committee of the College of Arts and Sciences, In-
diana University (this faculty-student committee has power to review grades challenged
for errors and to implement remedies which may include grade revisions). See also Ross
v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 445 F. Supp. 147, 153 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (although university had
procedures for academic review available to undergraduate students, because of "failure
of the procedures specifically to mention graduate students" graduate student dismissed
from school and from assistantship for "unsatisfactory scholarship" had no right of access
to those procedures). Graduate and professional schools remain, however, the unbreached
bastions of academic abstention; in the Horowitz case, the University's Medical School was
unusual in possessing the institutional review procedures it did, even though they did not
provide for student appearances. Cf. INDIANA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, ACADEMIC REGULA-
TIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS (March 1977); NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW,
STUDENT HANDBOOK AND ACADEMIC REGULATIONS 1978-79; UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO
SCHOOL OF LAW, ACADEMIC POLICIES AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES (August 1, 1979) (ex-
amples of law school regulatory instruments which do not provide for procedures for review-
ing academic evaluations). It is unclear why graduate and professional schools do not general-
ly possess mechanisms for resolving student challenges; part of the explanation probably
lies in the emphasis on informality and egalitarianism in instruction at this level. For a
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The concern emanates from the fact that "academic abstention" is an in-
evitable aspect of all graduate education. This note will trace the
emergence of the doctrine, examine the rationales advanced to support
it, argue for its elimination, and suggest a model for affording due pro-
cess in academic decisionmaking.
ACADEMIC ABSTENTION
The first case addressing judicial review of academic dismissals was
Barnard v. Inhabitants of Shelburne,' which involved the dismissal of a
student from a private high school for failure to maintain the required
grade point average The court, in upholding the action of the school of-
ficials, held: "The care and management of schools . . . includes the
establishment and maintenance of standards for the promotion of students
... and for their continuance as members of any particular class. So long
as the school committee act in good faith their conduct.., is not subject
to review... -"I In a passage which the Supreme Court quoted in Board
of Curators v. Horowitz," upholding the dismissal of the medical student
described above, the Barnard court introduced what was to become the prin-
cipal doctrine in this area-the distinction between academic and disciplinary
dismissals:
When the real ground of exclusion is not misconduct there is no obliga-
tion on the part of the school committee to grant a hearing .... Miscon-
duct is a very different matter from failure to attain a standard of
excellence in studies.... A public hearing may be regarded as helpful
discussion of the "continuum of subjectivity" in education, see LaMorte, Educationally Sound
Due Process in Academic Affairs, 8 J.L. & EDUC. 197, 209 (1979) ("At the other end of the
continuum, the graduate level, evaluation tends to become more subjective as the instruc-
tion becomes increasingly individualized. ... Although potential for unfair treatment exists
at all levels in education, a 'continuum of subjectivity' suggests that there is greater op-
portunity for such treatment to occur at the higher levels.").
1 216 Mass. 19, 102 N.E. 1095 (1913). Although there were other, earlier cases concern-
ing refusals to grant degrees, Barnard was the first case specifically to address academic
dismissals and to draw a distinction between the review appropriate to them and that
necessary for disciplinary dismissals. For illustrations of early degree disputes, see Smith
v. Board of Educ., 182 Ill. App. 342 (1913) (upholding dismissal of student from high school
for membership in fraternity; student sought hearing to prove he was not a member; hear-
ing denied; dismissal upheld); People ex reL Goldenhoff v. Albany Law School, 198 A.D. 460,
466, 191 N.Y.S. 349, 353 (1921) (student expelled for "unpatriotic and revolutionary views");
People ex rel. O'Sullivan v. New York Law School, 68 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 118, 22 N.Y.S. 663 (1893)
(refusal to confer degree on student who, after passing all final exams, argued with dean
day before graduation); People ex rel. Jones v. New York Homeopathic Medical College,
47 N.Y. St. R. 395, 20 N.Y.S. 379 (Super. Ct. 1892) (medical student's application for writ
of mandamus to compel medical school to issue diploma allegedly withheld in "bad faith
and ill will" denied).
216 Mass. at 19-20, 102 N.E. at 1095-96.
'o Id. at 21, 102 N.E. at 1096.
n 435 U.S. 78, 87 (1978).
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to the ascertainment of misconduct and useless or harmful in finding
out the truth as to scholarship.
12
Since Barnard, courts have routinely distinguished cases involving
disciplinary dismissals from those involving academic dismissals; judicial
review and due process are required in the former and denied in the
latter." One reason for this greater receptivity to due process claims in
disciplinary actions is that these actions are seen as more "factual" in
nature and thus more amenable to resolution through a judicial hearing:
"A decision relating to the misconduct of a student requires a factual deter-
mination as to whether the conduct took place or not. The accuracy of
that determination can be safeguarded by the sorts of procedural protec-
tions traditionally imposed under the Due Process Clause."" "The require-
ment of a hearing, where the student could present his side of the factual
issue, could under such circumstances 'provide a meaningful hedge against
erroneous action.' ",,5 According to Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion
in Horowitz, "suspensions of students for disciplinary reasons have a suf-
ficient resemblance to traditional judicial and administrative factfinding
to call for a 'hearing' before the relevant school authority."'
6
Conversely, judges have been reluctant to extend these due process
guarantees to students facing academic sanctions, the presumption being
that academic dismissals are not amenable to judicial review: they
involve esoteric issues and arcane erudition with which judges are un-
familiar; they are subjective and evaluative assessments predicated on
informal student-teacher interaction rather than on objective conduct;"
,2 216 Mass. at 22, 102 N.E. at 1097.
"5 "[T]he due process requirements of notice and hearing.., have been carefully limited
to disciplinary decisions." Mahavongsanon v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448, 449 (5th Cir. 1976) (student
denied relief in action brought to compel university to grant her degree because of alleged
denial of substantive and procedural due process in her termination from graduate pro-
gram). "There is a clear dichotomy between a student's due process rights in disciplinary
dismissals and in academic dismissals." Id. at 450; accord, Keys v. Sawyer, 353 F. Supp.
936, 939-40 (S.D. Tex. 1973) (law student sought readmission to law school and expunge-
ment of failing grades from transcript).
The assignment of grades to a particular examination must be left to the discre-
tion of the instructor. He should be given the unfettered opportunity to assess
a student's performance and determine if it attains a standard of scholarship
required for ... a satisfactory grade. The federal judiciary should not adjudicate
the soundness of a professor's grading system, nor make a factual determina-
tion of the fairness of the individual grades.
Id. at 939-40; accord, Connelly v. University of Vt., 244 F. Supp. 156, 160 (D. Vt. 1965) (stu-
dent dismissed from medical school seeking reinstatement; was in good standing in third
year when dismissed for failure in one course; alleged bad faith by professor). "[Slchool
authorities [have] absolute discretion in determining whether a student has been delinquent
in his studies .. " Id. at 160.
" 435 U.S. at 95 n.5 (Powell, J., concurring).
" 435 U.S. at 89 (majority opinion).
16 Id. at 88-89.
" Justice Powell defends the distinction between "factual conduct" and "subjective evalua-
tions" in his concurring opinion in Horowitz. See id. at 92 (Powell, J., concurring) (procedural
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and judicial intervention would jeopardize professional autonomy and
scholarly integrity.'8 This forbearance has been apparent in suits seeking
review of academic decisions in law schools,'9 medical schools,20 graduate
safeguards are useful in former and useless in latter). Although he recognizes that an
academic judgment may also involve "objectively determinable fact" (e.g., examination
answers, papers), he feels that here the "critical decision" requires a "subjective, expert
evaluation" of that performance in terms of a standard of academic competence; therefore,
characterization of a dismissal as academic has "controlling significance in determining how
much and what sort of process is due." Id. at 95 n.5. Justice Marshall's opinion, id. at 97
(Marshall, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part), agreed that Horowitz was granted
as much due process as was required, but disagrees with the traditional approach of dividing
dismissals into "academic" and "disciplinary." "In my view the effort to apply such labels
does little to advance the due process inquiry... Id. at 103 (Marshall, J., concurring in
part & dissenting in part). He would consider the critical question to be whether "the facts
disputed are of a type susceptible of determination by third parties." Id. at 104 n.18 (Mar-
shall, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). In this instance, Justice Marshall felt
that, while Horowitz' dismissal for clinical deficiencies was so susceptible, the procedures
provided were adequate to provide a "fair and neutral and impartial" assessment of the
school's charges. Id. at 102 (Marshall, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). In future
disputes, he would provide full procedural protection in cases "where the dismissal is bas-
ed not on failing grades but on conduct-related considerations. Id. at 106 (Marshall, J., con-
curring in part & dissenting in part). For an example of the latter, see Brookins v. Bonnel,
362 F. Supp. 379, 383 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (nursing student expelled for failure to have required
physical exam, submit transcript, and attend classes; held entitled due process hearing
because issue was of factual nature and did not require "reference .. . to ... a standard
of achievement in an esoteric academic field").
,1 See Keys v. Sawyer, 353 F. Supp. 936 (S.D. Tex. 1973); Mustell v. Rose, 282 Ala. 358,
361, 211 So. 2d 489, 493 (1968) (student dismissed from medical school filed for mandatory
injunction seeking reinstatement; denied on principle of "judicial nonintervention in scholastic
affairs"), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 936 (1968). "An adjudicative hearing will not determine whether
a student's educational performance was unsatisfactory. That issue would be resolved only
by re-grading the student's examination, which is a professor's and not a judge's function."
Abbariao v. Hamlne Univ. School of Law, - Minn. -, - , 25P N.W.2d 108, 112 (1977).
In Abbariao, a law student dismissed for failure to maintain a minimum grade point average
filed for an injunction, seeking reinstatement until afforded an opportunity to contest the
dismissal; he charged that the school failed to maintain a consistent grading policy, failed
to notify him of his grades or his probationary status, and failed to provide, as the bulletin
maintained, tutorial seminars for students with failing grades; the case was remanded for
hearing on an allegation of discriminatory grading based on hostility of professors.
'" See Miller v. Hamline Univ. School of Law, 601 F.2d 970 (1979) (student expelled for
failing grades sued for reinstatement; suit dismissed on grounds that no hearing before
admissions committee was required as due process in dismissal); Abbariao v. Hamline Univ.
School of Law, - Minn. - , 258 N.W.2d 108 (1977); Johnson v. Sullivan, 174 Mont. 491,
571 P.2d 798 (1977) (student brought suit for readmission to state law school claiming viola-
tion of due process in law school's calculating grades differently than rest of university
and in denial of petition for readmission when others were granted; relief refused); Horne
v. Cox, - Tenn. -, - 551 S.W.2d 690, 691 (1977) (denial of state university law stu-
dent's seeking appeal of grade which he claimed was assigned for "extraneous" factors:
"There are no constitutional or statutory provisions granting any legal rights or privileges
to students in the educational institutions of this state with respect to grades.").
" See Watson v. University of S. Ala. College of Medicine, 463 F. Supp. 720 (S.D. Ala.
1979) (black medical student brought due process challenge to dismissal; denied on basis
that, among other factors, same committee which recommended dismissal's acting as ap-
peal board was not violation of due process); Depperman v. University of Ky., 371 F. Supp.
73 (E.D. Ky. 1974) (student attacked actions by medical school officials which led to his volun-
tary departure; on probation for defective "interpersonal competence" and threatened with
1981]
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schools,2' although the military academies do provide some contrary
examples.'
Maintaining that the respondent in Horowitz was accorded "at least as
much due process as the Fourteenth Amendment requires,"' Justice Rehn-
quist reiterated the logic relied on by the Barnard court sixty-five years
earlier: academic evaluations differ from judicial or administrative fact-
finding proceedings because there is a significant difference between
failure to meet academic standards and violation of valid rules of conduct,
and less stringent procedural requirements are needed in an academic
dismissal.
In addition to its concern with the problems of justiciability inherent
in non-factfinding proceedings, the academic abstention doctrine defers
to the policy of academic freedom. Courts have been reluctant to intervene
in the student evaluation process because of a presumed threat to the
delicate equilibrium of the scholarly community.2 The presumption has
expulsion, he quit voluntarily, underwent psychiatric counseling which he had been told
would result in readmission; readmission denied and student brought action claiming facul-
ty hostility; remanded for hearing on hostility issue); Maitland v. Wayne State Univ. Medical
School, 76 Mich. App. 631, 257 N.W.2d 195 (1977) (in first suit, alleging academic dismissal
was result of testing errors, student was reinstated after passing exam ordered by trial
court; appeals court found remedy to be error but declined to intervene where student was
doing well in school).
2 See Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1976); Ross v. Pennsylvania State
Univ., 445 F. Supp. 147 (M.D. Pa. 1978); Stevenson v. Board of Regents, 393 F. Supp. 812(W.D. Tex. 1975) (graduate student challenged dismissal from doctoral program alleging ex-
aminers biased against his promotional activities of a product in his field and that he was
improperly asked about those activities in qualifying exam; relief denied); Dehaan v. Brandeis
Univ., 150 F. Supp. 626 (D. Mass. 1957) (graduate student brought suit seeking reinstate-
ment in university after being dismissed without hearing and without explanation; denied);
Edde v. Columbia Univ., 8 Misc. 2d 795, 168 N.Y.S.2d 643 (Sup. Ct. 1957) (student sought
order directing university to reinstate him as candidate for Ph.D.; court refused on grounds
it was within university's discretion to reject him on basis of its assessment of his
dissertation).
' See Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1972) (West Point appealed order grant-
ing injunction restraining it from ordering cadet to active duty and ordering his readmis-
sion; held, cadet threatened with expulsion must be allowed to present evidence and speak
for himself even in subjective assessments of his capacities); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382
F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967) (cadet expelled from Merchant Marine Academy without hearing;
remanded for hearing as to whether in view of actual facts involved due process was denied,
being defined as notice of charges, opportunity to present defense and fair hearing).
435 U.S. at 85.
2, Id. at 86-89.
See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 195 (1972) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("It is within[the college administrative structure] and within the academic community that problems
such as these should be resolved."); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957)(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (reversing contempt citation of socialist professor who refus-
ed to answer questions concerning his lectures and political beliefs when called before
legislative committee). "'It is the business of the university to provide that atmosphere
which is most conducive to speculation, creating and experiment. It is an atmosphere in
which there prevail the "four essential freedoms" of a university-to determine for itself
on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who
may be admitted to study.'" Id. (quoting The Open Universities in South Africa 10-12 (1957)
(statement of conference of senior scholars at Cape Town University and University of Wit-
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been that any interference would jeopardize the intellectual activities car-
ried on at this level.' Because higher education produces direct benefits
for society, and because of this perception that it is the most successful
when least fettered, professors have been left unchallenged in their ap-
praisals of students.'
Historically, academic freedom and academic abstention are traceable
to principles established in medieval times, when a university was an
autonomous corporation which enjoyed independence from and influence
over emperors and popes.' The university had complete authority over
the conduct of its students, as well as their academic status.' The rela-
tionship between the school and its students was clearly defined: students
assumed a posture of absolute obedience to the university hierarchy and,
in turn, the university assumed total responsibility for their general
welfare, acting "in loco parentis."30
This surrogate parent role encompassed both the pupil's "physical and
moral welfare"'" and academic training. School authority over the former
was generally accepted' until the 1960's, when student challenges suc-
ceeded in extending due process protection to conduct dismissals.3 Similar
watersrand)). The Horowitz decision also explicitly recognized this obligation: "We decline
to further enlarge the judicial presence in the academic community and thereby risk
deterioration of many beneficial aspects of the faculty/student relationship." 435 U.S. at
90. See also Comment, Academic Dismissals from State-Supported Universities: A Study in
Policy, 13 VAL. U.L. REV. 175 (1978).
"Diminution of professorial discretion has been characterized as dangerous to institu-
tional autonomy and, consequently to academic freedom:' Doniger, Grades: Review of
Academic Evaluations in Law Schools, 11 PAC. L.J. 743,747 n.28 (1980); accord, Perkins, The
University in Due Process, 62 ALA. BULL. 977, 981 (1968) ("Qualitative decisions are the
essence of academic life .... To put academic discipline, appointment grading, and all man-
ner of educational requirements at the mercy of the courts would mean, quite simply, that
civil jurisdiction over intellectual inquiry would be complete . 1...").
"See REPORT OF A SPECIAL COMMITTEE, RELEVANT GENERAL PRINCIPLES (1956), reprinted
in ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE 47-48 (L. Joughin ed. 1969).
2 R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED
STATES 5-7 (1955). For information concerning the status of academic freedom elsewhere, see
J. EMBLING, A FRESH LOOK AT HIGHER EDUCATION 95-101 (1974); Self-perpetuating Professional
Oligarchy, London Times Higher Educ. Supp., Nov. 23, 1973, at 6 (academic freedom in British
universities). For a comment on the situation of graduate students in British universities,
see Plight of the Postgraduates, London Times Higher Educ. Supp., Dec. 14, 1973, at 14 (discuss-
ing problems of "graduate proletariat" who are not independently represented in universi-
ty governance, and who must depend on patronage system, not unlike, perhaps, American
system for academic jobs).
2 M. Ross, THE UNIVERSITY 69-70 (1976).
w Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 379, 161 S.W. 204, 206 (1913). "The school, its of-
ficials and students, are a legal entity, as much so as any family, and, like a father may
direct his children, those in charge of boarding schools are well within their rights and powers
when they direct their students what to eat and where they may get it, where they may
go, and what forms of amusement are forbidden." Id. at 381, 161 S.W. at 207.
' Id.; accord, H. EDWARDS & V. NORDIN, supra note 7, at 349-51.
See, e.g., Seavey, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process," 70 HARV. L. REV. 1406 (1957).
See John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924) (student expelled
for "disorders bordering on insurrection," i.e., hazing, "ringing cow bells," "cutting lights,"
in dormitory; in action for malicious expulsion, held, school under no duty to make and prove
1981]
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challenges to academic dismissals have remained unsuccessful' because
of the academic abstention doctrine.
specific charges); Smith v. Board of Educ., 182 Ill. App. 342 (1913) (dismissal for charge that
student belonged to fraternity without providing opportunity for denial); Vermillion v. State
ex rel. Englehardt, 78 Neb. 107, 110 N.W. 736 (1907) (school boards have power to expel
students from public schools for "gross disobedience" without notice to pupil or formal hear-
ing); Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 A.D. 487, 488-89, 231 N.Y.S. 435, 437 (1928) (dismissal
of fourth-year student; only explanation given was that she had "caused a lot of trouble"
at her sorority and failed to act like a "typical Syracuse girl"); People ex rel. O'Sullivan
v. New York Law School, 68 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 118, 22 N.Y.S. 663 (1893) (dismissal of law stu-
dent who argued with dean on the day before graduation).
It was customary early in this century for universities to include regulations, which
students were required to sign, allowing dismissal for the broadest possible reasons; one
example is that referred to in Anthony: "ITihe University reserves the right to request the
withdrawal of any student whose presence is deemed detrimental. Specific charges may
or may not accompany a request for withdrawal." 224 A.D. at 489, 231 N.Y.S. at 438. The
cases which changed all this and established due process in discipline were Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565 (1975), and Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961). Dixon was an action brought by six former students at
an Alabama state college alleging that they were denied due process in being dismissed
as students with no formal charges being filed and no hearing granted; the Fifth Circuit
held that due process does require notice and a hearing in disciplinary dismissals; the court
indicated that the notice should include "a statement of the specific charges and grounds
which, if proven, would justify expulsion," 294 F.2d at 158, and that, while the nature of
the hearing could vary with the circumstances, "the rudiments of an adversary proceeding"
must be preserved, id. at 159. Goss was a challenge brought by nine high school students
against the Columbus, Ohio, Board of Education for suspending them from school for as
long as 10 days without a hearing; plaintiffs argued that the statute empowering principals
to suspend students without a hearing violated due process; the Supreme Court found the
statute unconstitutional and explicitly recognized that public school students have liberty
and property interests which require due process even in temporary suspensions. 419 U.S.
at 576. Due process in this context requires, according to the Court, that the student receive
notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the evidence against him, and an op-
portunity to present his side of the story. Id. at 581. The Court noted that such notice and
hearing "provide a meaningful hedge against erroneous action." Id. at 583; accord, Blanton
v. State Univ. of N.Y., 489 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1973),(upholding suspensions imposed by student-
faculty Disciplinary Hearing Committee on grounds that due process was observed in terms
of charges, evidence and hearing); Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969) (disciplinary
expulsions must be based on properly promulgated regulations of conduct of which students
have notice; expulsion for "misconduct" unconstitutionally vague). The concern with due
process in this area led to the formulation of special standards to be employed in such
challenges in the Western District of Missouri. Memorandum on Judicial Standards of Pro-
cedure and Substance in Review of Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of
Higher Education, 45 F.R.D. 134 (W.D. Mo. 1968). Contra, Esteban v. Central Mo. State Col-
lege, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969) (upholding suspensions of students for participation in
mass demonstrations; procedural due process challenge denied).
I See notes 19-22 supra. But see Miller v. Dailey, 136 Cal. 212, 68 P. 1029 (1902) (court
held that mandamus would lie to compel readmission of student dismissed from normal school
during student teaching); State v. Lincoln Medical College, 81 Neb. 533, 116 N.W. 294 (1908)
(trial court ordered re-evaluation of grade allegedly based on bad faith). It is noteworthy
that the only cases in which courts have intervened in school affairs predate Barnard and
the "official" emergence of academic abstention. Even in the pre-Barnard years, however,
such intervention was unusual. The only exception to this phenomenon was, arguably,
Greenhill v. Bailey, 519 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1975), which held that the stigmatization attendant
upon academic dismissal from medical school was sufficiently injurious to the liberty in-
terest in reputation to require notice and an informal hearing before dismissal. Justice Rehn-
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Students have a compelling interest in the retention of their student
status; considerations of "student tenure" become especially pressing at
the graduate and professional school level. For these students, academic
dismissals represent deprivations of interests of sufficient magnitude to
warrant the imposition of due process protections. The importance of the
interests at stake was raised by the respondent in Horowitz but was not
resolved.
Charlotte Horowitz did not allege a deprivation of property;' instead,
she argued that the dismissal deprived her of a liberty interest by
"foreclosing... educational or employment opportunities."37 Writing for
the Court, Justice Rehnquist noted that it was not necessary to reach the
issue as to whether a protected interest was involved; assuming the ex-
istence of either a liberty or a property interest, the procedures afforded
"at least as much due process as the Fourteenth Amendment requires."38
quist, writing for the Court in Horowitz, distinguished Greenhill on the grounds that "the
publicizing of an alleged deficiency in the student's intellectual ability removed the case from
the typical instance of academic dismissal and called for greater procedural protections." 435
U.S. at 88 n.5 (emphasis added). It seems, then, that in order to trigger Greenhill-style pro-
cedures it is necessary that there be action beyond "mere" dismissal action analogous to
the action of the school in Greenhill in notifying a national medical association that the stu-
dent lacked "intellectual ability." 519 F.2d at 8.
1 "Student tenure" is a phrase which will be used to refer to the student's interest in
(and expectation of) remaining in school until the normal completion of his course of study;
it is not intended to be an exact analogue of professorial tenure, but rather to suggest an
implicit assumption of nonproblematic continuation. The importance of student tenure in
graduate and professional school has been noted by a number of authors: "Now that admis-
sion to college is increasingly difficult, an expulsion from an institution of higher education
siguificantly reduces a student's chances of completing his educational program .... [Tihe
dismissal always remains a part of his educational record." Developments in the Law-
Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1154 (1968).
Since an academic dismissal remains part of a student's educational record,
educational opportunities may be foreclosed at many more schools or univer-
sities than the one from which the student was actually dismissed. One pur-
pose of the "Dean's Letter" required by many graduate and professional schools
is to ascertain whether the student has ever been disciplined for academic or
non-academic reasons.... Since student applications so greatly out-number
available openings in U.S. medical schools, it is the policy of some medical
schools never to admit a student who has previously been dropped from another
medical school for academic reasons ....
An academic dismissal can also plague students once they leave the educa-
tional system; consider the reluctance. of many people to go to a doctor or lawyer
who had once been dismissed from medical or law school. The relevation [sic]
of such dismissals is also both required and considered relevant to the admis-
sion to the practice of law in many states.
Dessem, Student Due Process Rights in Academic Dismissals from the Public Schools, 5 J.L.
& EDUC. 277, 287 n.74 (1976). See also Doniger, supra note 26, at 744-47.
3' 435 U.S. at 82.
" Id.; Brief for Respondent, supra note 1, at 12.
" 435 U.S. at 84-85.
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In his concurrence Justice White agreed that the procedures in this in-
stance were satisfactory; he disagreed, however, with the implication in
the majority opinion that academic dismissals do not require a hearing
or an opportunity for student response. 9 Assuming a protected interest,
he would require that students facing dismissal be informed of the reasons
for the action and be allowed to argue against it." Justice Marshall join-
ed Justice White in disputing the implication that academic dismissals re-
quire "far less stringent procedural requirements"41 than do disciplinary
dismissals;4 because of the importance of the interest at stake in such
dismissals, he would require that students be granted a "forum" in which
to contest the contemplated action." He felt, however, that the procedures
employed in the Horowitz affair were more than adequate."
Because the Court did not decide whether protected interests are im-
plicated in academic dismissals,45 the extent to which students are entitled
to due process in these actions remains unclear. Since it is clear, however,
that students must demonstrate the presence of either a liberty or proper-
ty interest in order to qualify for due process protections," it is necessary
to examine the relevance of each for the educational context.
Id. at 96-97 (White, J., concurring).
40 Id. at 97 (White, J., concurring).
Id. at 86 (majority opinion).
Id. at 103-07 (Marshall, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
' Id. at 102 n.14 (Marshall, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
Id- at 102-03 (Marshall, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
"We need not decide ... whether respondent's dismissal deprived her of a liberty
interest in pursuing a medical career. Nor need we decide whether respondent's dismissal
infringed any other interest constitutionally protected against deprivation without procedural
due process." Id. at 84 (majority opinion). Since the Court did not reach this issue, the nature
of a student's interest in his educational tenure remains, at best, an "interstitial" one; that
is, articulation of such an interest must proceed in the interstices between the Greenhill
v. Bailey, 519 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1975), holding that dismissals may jeopardize liberty interests
given "publication" of the reasons for dismissal, id. at 8, and the Supreme Court's decision
that Horowitz received her due in procedural protection. This note is an attempt to ex-
trapolate, from Horowitz, the kinds of institutional procedures commensurate with the pro-
tection required for such an "interstitial" interest.
" See 435 U.S. at 82. In assessing due process claims, the Supreme Court looks at three
factors: first, the importance of the private interest which the claimant alleges to be im-
periled; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest; and third, the value,
if any, of additional or alternative procedures in reducing that risk. Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). Private interests which will receive due process protection must
qualify as protected interests under the fourteenth amendment's guarantees of "liberty"
and "property." See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). In Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565 (1975), the Supreme Court recognized that a 10-day suspension from school
was of sufficient gravity to require due process although "a far milder deprivation than
expulsion." Id. at 576. The Court went on to note: "Neither the property interest in educa-
tional benefits temporarily denied nor the liberty interest in reputation ... is so insubstan-
tial that suspensions may constitutionally be imposed by any procedures the school chooses,
no matter how arbitrary." Id. For a general perspective on the type of procedural re-
quirements which have been imposed in other contexts, see Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564 (1972) (state university professor initially hired for one-year term claimed viola-
tion of due process in nonrenewal of contract; procedures upheld in absence of protected
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Liberty
Like academic freedom, "liberty interest" is a nebulous concept; the
Supreme Court's most commonly applied definition47 is that liberty en-
compasses, in addition to "freedom from bodily restraint ... the right
of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations
of life, to acquire useful knowledge . . . and generally to enjoy those
privileges ... recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pur-
suit of happiness by free men."48 It follows, therefore, that academic
dismissals foreclose liberty interests in two ways: they terminate the op-
portunity to "acquire useful knowledge" and they foreclose access to a
professional career.
Employment opportunities were recognized as a liberty interest in
Board of Regents v. Roth49 and Bishop v. Wood.0 Roth was an action by
a nontenured assistant professor alleging that the nonrenewal of his con-
tract after his first academic year violated his procedural due process
rights.5 The Supreme Court, while explicitly recognizing that there are
circumstances in which refusal to re-employ an individual threatens liberty
interests, denied his claim because there was no explicit stigma associated
with the refusal to rehire.52 The obvious import of the Court's analysis
is that had there been present any negative connotations to the refusal
which would have "foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other
employment opportunities,"'' then a liberty interest would have been en-
dangered and he would have been entitled to due process.4
interest); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare recipients entitled to evidentiary
hearing, including counsel and cross-examination of witnesses, before termination of benefits);
Willner v. Committee of Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963) (petitioner denied due pro-
cess when denied admission to bar without hearing on charges filed against him; such ap-
plicants must be given notice, hearing and opportunity to present evidence); Cafeteria
Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (holding that "the very nature of due process
negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situa-
tion" and that the determination of exactly what procedures are due depends on a deter-
mination of "the precise nature of the government function involved" and of the "private
interest ... affected)".
Although due process is a flexible concept, it requires that an individual threatened with
loss of a protected interest be provided, at a minimum, with "some kind of notice and af-
forded some kind of hearing." Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. at 579. For a general statement of
the kinds of procedures required in disciplinary actions, see Dixon v. Alabama State Bd.
of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961). See also Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U.
PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975).
," See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S.
312 (1921); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918).
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
" 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
0 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
51 408 U.S. at 572.
2 Id. at 573.
SId.
Id. at 573-74.
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Bishop was a suit brought by a city policeman arguing that his dismissal
without a hearing violated his due process rights." Again the Supreme
Court found no deprivation of a liberty interest because of the absence
of stigma associated with the removal. 6 The decisive fact in this instance
was that the reasons for the dismissal were not made public; since the
allegations were communicated to the man privately, they could not have
damaged his "good name, reputation, honor, or integrity" in such a way
as to foreclose other employment. '
According to Roth, Wood and their progeny, the critical factor is the
presence of action which effectively terminates access to employment in
the future: actions which may make an individual "somewhat less attrac-
tive to employers"' do not constitute deprivations of liberty; actions which
curtail careers do.
To constitute a cognizable liberty interest there must be established
more than a vague prejudice to one's general community reputation. In
Paul v. Davis9 the Supreme Court refused to extend due process protec-
tion to an individual whose employment opportunities were affected by
circulation of a description of him as an active shoplifter.' This refusal
was based on the proposition that prior cases did "not establish ... reputa-
tion alone, apart from some more tangible interests such as employment
.. [as] liberty ... sufficient to involve the requirements of the due pro-
cess clause." ' This "reputation-plus"" test requires the presence of a
stigma which significantly alters a status recognized or established by
state law6 to constitute a liberty interest deprivation.
Property
The Supreme Court has indicated that protected interests in property
are not created by the Constitution but are defined by "state law, rules,
or understandings that secure certain benefits."' In order to possess a
426 U.S. at 347-49.
56 Id.
" Id. at 348.
' Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
59 Id.
Id. at 701.
65 L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS S 10-11, at 528 (1978). Tribe
says that Davis was "a considerable departure from past precedents," id., in that it aban-
doned the older concept of a "core" interest in reputation (which Tribe describes as having
emerged in the early 1970's, id. S 10-9, at 517-20) and held that reputation alone, absent
.some more tangible interests such as a specific job," id. S 10-11, at 528 (footnote omitted),
is not a cognizable liberty or property interest requiring due process protection. Id at 527-28.
For Tribe's interpretation of Davis' implications, see id. at 528-30.
Id. S 10-11 at 528. See also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. at 701.
424 U.S. at 708-09.
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
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property interest so defined, one must have "more than an abstract need
or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation .of it.
He must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it."'"
The Supreme Court has found a protected property interest in a pro-
fessor's tenure status and in a high school student's enrollment status.
In Perry v. Sindermann the Court recognized a cause of action in a state
junior college professor's claim that the failure of the college to provide
him with a hearing as an incident to deciding whether to renew his
teaching contract violated his due process rights. Although there was no
state statute explicitly granting him tenure, the majority opinion
acknowledged the possibility of an unwritten university "common law"
which could have entitled him to tenure.17 If he could establish "the ex-
istence of rules and understandings, promulgated and fostered by state
officials" which would justify his "legitimate claim of entitlement to con-
tinued employment" then this unwritten tenure policy would obligate the
college to provide him with a hearing on his nonretention."
In Goss v. Lopez, 9 the Supreme Court recognized that public school
students have a property interest in their education that is derived from
state free education and compulsory attendance laws: "Having chosen to
extend the right to an education to people of appellees' class generally,
[the state] may not withdraw that right ... absent fundamentally fair pro-
cedures. . .. ",0
Student Status and Due Process
What the above, unfortunately cursory, discussion indicates is that there
are extant doctrines which would permit the recognition of graduate-
professional student status as a protected interest.7 ' Implicit in the Court's
65 Id.
408 U.S. 593 (1972).
Id. at 602.
Id. at 602-03.
" 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
70 Id. at 574. The Court also commented that "the State is constrained to recognize a stu-
dent's legitimate entitlement to a public education as a property interest which is protected
by the Due Process clause .... Id. Justice White, writing for the Court, went on to note that
"[t]he student's interest is to avoid unfair or mistaken exclusion from the educational process,
with all of its unfortunate consequences." Id. at 579. See also Whiteside v. Kay, 446 F. Supp.
716 (W.D. La. 1978) (case upholding statutory procedure followed in high school's suspension
of student as meeting minimum due process requirements of notice, hearing and evidence for
disciplinary hearing). "Suspension or expulsion of a child from public school deprives the child
of property and liberty rights, as it may limit later opportunities... :'Id. at 719.
71 Much of what follows is, of course, also applicable to post-secondary students as well;
however, this discussion is phrased in terms of more advanced students' circumstances both
because of the finite limits of this note, see note 7 supra, and because many of the unfortunate
implications of academic dismissals are much more obvious in this context.
For example, in January of the year Horowitz had expected to graduate, the University
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decision that Charlotte Horowitz was "awarded at least as much due pro-
cess as the Fourteenth Amendment requires"' is a recognition that a con-
stitutionally cognizable interest was implicated; that implication is rein-
forced by the Court's declining to rule on the nature of the interest
presumably involved in academic decisions.73 And there are compelling
arguments for recognizing "student tenure"7 as either a property or a
liberty interest.
The recognition that students have a property interest in their status
could be based upon the definitions of such interests presented in Board
of Regents v. Roth75 and in Perry v. Sindermann.7 Roth said that property
interests are created and defined by "existing rules or understandings
... that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement
to those benefits." 7 Arguably, the "existing rules and understandings"
necessary to establish a property interest for students could be found in
an "implicit contract, which creates the expectation that a student will
of North Carolina offered her a position as a research associate in the department of psychiatry.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 1, at 9-10; Veron, DueProcessFlexibilityinAcademicDismissals
Horowitz and Beyond, 8 J.L. & EDUC. 45,48 n.15 (1979). As Dr. Hilliard Cohen, one of the seven
physicians who evaluated Horowitz in her final, predismissal appeal, testified at the original trial:
"Yes, I would be very much concerned about an individual who was dismissed
from a medical school, or, for that matter, from any graduate school. This to me
is a very serious matter and I would have to look very carefully into that per-
son's background, record and so forth. And if there were two individuals, that,
say, that person or someone else were applying and otherwise would have equal
qualifications, roughly, I would lean heavily to the other person who was not
dismissed from a graduate school .... Yes, I think it would be a significant black
mark against that person's name. I think it would stigmatize that individual. I
think that person would probably be-well, would have great difficulty to get
into another medical school, if at all."
Id. (Dr. Cohen's comments were made as one who had "had 30 years of experience in hiring
M.D.'s, Ph.D.'s and others for medical research in various institutions." Id.).
' Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 85.
' Id. at 84.
, This term, again, is used to refer to the student's expectation (cum entitlement that,
absent clearly defined "extraordinary" circumstances, he will be entitled to pursue the course
of study for which he "contracted." For a general discussion of contract law as related to
student expectations, see Note, Contract Law and the Student-University Relationship, 48
IND. L.J. 253 (1973); Comment, Consumer Protection and Higher Education-Student Suits
Against Schools, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 608, 611-18 (1976). For a slightly different approach to the
nature of the university's relationship with its students, see Goldman, The University and
the Liberty of Its Students-A Fiduciary Theory, 54 Ky. L.J. 643 (1966).
11 408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972).
7' 408 U.S. 593 (1972). A recent case found that a student had a property interest, a
"legitimate claim of entitlement," in her degree; in noting probable jurisdiction over a degree
dispute, the court commented: "[o]rdinarily, courts will defer to the broad discretion vested
in school officials to evaluate a student's academic performance. However, when the state
action deprives an individual of a significant liberty or property interest, judicial interven-
tion, of necessity, occurs." Udell v. University of Lowell, No. 77 Civ. 3343 (S.D.N.Y., filed
Jan. 15, 1979) (available Oct. 31, 1981, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
408 U.S. at 577.
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graduate unless his or her performance is not up to standards," 8 that con-
tract being entered into when the student enrolls. 79 Alternatively, the
"bilateral expectation" minimally required for a property interest could
be based on a student analogue of that "unwritten 'common law'" found
sufficient in Sindermann to support a junior college professor's "claim of
entitlement to continued employment."' With either of these alternatives,
78 Comment, Horowitz and Smith: The Continuing Devitalization of the Liberty Concept,
43 ALB. L. REV. 863, 889 (1979).
" A recent decision of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Penn-
sylvania explicitly recognized that graduate students do have such an interest:
A student has a reasonable expectation based on statements of policy ... and
the experience of former students that if he performs the required work in
a satisfactory manner and pays his fees he will receive the degree he seeks.
... [Plaintiff] as a graduate student has a property interest in the continua-
tion of his course of study....
Ross v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 445 F. Supp. 147, 152 (M.D. Pa. 1978). Ross derived the
property interest from fees paid, the experience of past students and representations of
university officials. A similar result was reached in Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843, 850
(10th Cir. 1975), which found that a nursing student had a property interest based on her
enrollment fees. For a discussion of Gaspar, and of property interests in academic actions
in general, see Note, Due Process in Academic Dismissals from Post Secondary Schools, 26
CATH. U.L. REV. 111, 122-24 (1976). An interesting case touching on some of these issues con-
cerned a medical school applicant who brought an action against the medical school which
had denied his application; the student alleged that the school had used an unpublished
criterion (i.e., ability to pledge large sums of money to the school) to evaluate applicants
and, in so doing, had breached a contract created upon its acceptance of application fees.
See Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School, 69 Ill. 2d 320, 371 N.E.2d 634 (1977). The Supreme
Court of Illinois held that there was a contract between the student and the school to the
effect that only published, academic criteria would be used in admissions evaluations; the
court found that the student had alleged facts sufficient to support both a breach of con-
tract and a fraud action. Id. at 332-33, 371 N.E.2d at 640-41. In discussing the fraud action,
the court indicated that, even if no contract in fact could be proven, the facts of the situa-
tion required that a "constructive contract," an "obligation created by law," be allowed.
Id. at 334, 371 N.E.2d at 641. The decision is interesting in the context of Ross and Gaspar,
because the court found a legal obligation on the part of the university to use academic
criteria in student evaluations; while far from presaging the end of academic abstention,
Steinberg is an interesting approach to establishing an (admittedly limited) student entitle-
ment under state law.
8 408 U.S. at 602-03. This is, in fact, what a district court did in Ross v. Pennsylvania
State Univ., 445 F. Supp. 147 (M.D. Pa. 1978); see note 79 supra. Using fees, policy statements
and custom, the court found that Ross did in fact have a property interest under state law
in "the continuation of his course of study." 445 F. Supp. at 152. This demonstration of such
an interest under state law is especially important given the Horowitz opinion's reference
to property interests as "creatures of state law." 435 U.S. at 82. While the exact implica-
tions of this cryptic allusion are unclear, they may, perhaps, be made less ominous by the
fact that Sindermann is cited as authority for the assertion. Some authors have suggested
that this comment was included to "foreclose ... before it was made" the argument that
students' property interests proceed from Ross-style contracts. Comment, supra note 78,
at 889. However, the seeming imperilment of nonstatutory entitlements appears to have
been vitiated, at least, by the Ross decision and by the Court's using the Roth standard
for property interests (deriving from state law, or other rules or understandings, 408 U.S.
at 577) recently in Memphis Light v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978). The Ross decision was sup-
plemented by a recent West Virginia decision which also found a property interest in stu-
dent status. Evans v. West Va. Bd. of Regents, - W. Va. -, 271 S.E.2d 778 (1980),
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the student's property right would encompass the expectation that, so long
as he fulfills the institutionally-defined obligations of his student role, he
will be permitted to progress toward, and achieve, the credentials which
culminate his course of study."
There are also doctrinal bases upon which to predicate a liberty interest
in student tenure; this was the interest which Charlotte Horowitz claim-
involved a former medical student seeking reinstatement after being on a one-year medical
leave of absence. Id. at -, 271 S.E.2d at 779-80. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia held that he was entitled to reinstatement, reasoning that appellant had a suffi-
cient property interest in the continuation and completion of his medical education to war-
rant the imposition of minimal procedural due process protections. Having completed two
and one-half years of medical education, the appellant had a reasonable expectation that
he would be permitted to complete his education absent a showing that specific conditions
and circumstances had developed since his original admission which would prevent him from
successfully completing the remainder of his education. This interest is sufficient to accord
the appellant a legitimate claim of entitlement. Id. at _ 271 S.E.2d at 780. The court
also distinguished the position of this student both from that of an initial applicant and
from that of Horowitz. It felt that this student had a property interest, based on his prior
attendance and reasonable expectations derived therefrom, which initial applicants did not
have, and that this interest demanded procedural protections which this student had been
denied. Id. at -, 271 S.E.2d at 780-81. Also, the court felt the student's situation was
distinguishable from Horowitz', based on his "good academic record" Id. at -, 271 S.E.2d
at 780. This decision is significant because it accords with Ross, and is another indication
that courts may be willing to find property rights in student tenure. For further implica-
tions of this decision, see note 117 infra.
" For a discussion, in another context, of the implied contract theory expressed in Roth
and Sindermann, see Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335,
347-50 (1974). In this same vein, William G. Buss observed that:
Horowitz was admitted as a regular student (in contrast, say, to admission for
only a year), presumably with the understanding that she would continue in
her status as a medical student until her graduation on the condition that she
satisfied school rules and met academic standards. Pursuant to this state-created
contractual arrangement she could, of course, be terminated for failing to satisfy
these conditions. But under Roth her contract would seem to have given her
a property interest of which she could not be deprived without due process
of law.
Buss, Easy Cases Make Bad Law: Academic Expulsion and the Uncertain Law of Procedural
Due Process, 65 IOWA L. REV. 1, 31 (1979).
In this perspective, students would have a right to continuation of their student status
absent a "for cause" basis for expulsion. This incorporates the standard developed in Bishop
v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976), and Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), requiring "pro-
cedural due process protection only if the law or contract defining the employee's job ex-
pressly provides that the employee can be discharged only for cause." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW S 10-10, at 524 (1978). An extrapolation of this standard to the educa-
tional context discussed herein would result in the requirement that, at least insofar as
academic dismissals are concerned, students be given an explanation of the reasons for ter-
mination, as well as an opportunity to challenge the validity of those reasons; this explana-
tion, and presumable challenge, would take place within the institution. "[W]hen reasonably
held expectations . .. establish a threshold security of interest, the holder is entitled to
a detailed statement of reasons for the termination of that interest, backed by the assurance
of limited judicial review of the adequacy of the administrative explanation." Rabin, Job
Security and Due Process: Monitoring Administrative Discretion Through a Reasons Require-
ment, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 60, 86 (1976). For a further development of this theme, which Rabin
calls "the right to an adequate explanation," id. at 80, see the model of academic decision-
making developed in text accompanying notes 110-31 infra.
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ed, and it was upon a finding that her dismissal had deprived her of a
liberty interest that the Eighth Circuit based its decision in her favor.2
Student status qualifies as a liberty interest as defined in Board of Regents
v. Roth," Bishop v. Wood" and Paul v. Davis.' It satisfies the "reputation
plus tangible interest"'88 threshold for due process protection: dismissal
from a graduate or professional degree program inflicts damage upon the
student's intellectual reputation which inevitably results in the foreclosure
of employment opportunities; this foreclosure is the product of two in-
tertwined factors-the intellectual stigma resulting from an academic
dismissal and the fact that graduate degrees are required for entering
these careers." Therefore, academic dismissals impose the "consequen-
11 See Horowitz v. Board of Curators, 538 F.2d 1317 (8th Cir. 1976). The basis for the
holding was that her dismissal had imposed a stigma which foreclosed admission to another
medical school and, therefore, resulted in her losing her offer of employment at the University
of North Carolina: "Horowitz has been stigmatized by her dismissal in such a way that she
will be unable to continue her medical education, and her chances of returning to employ-
ment in a medically related field are severely damaged." Id. at 1321.
408 U.S. 564 (1972).
426 U.S. 341 (1976).
424 U.S. 693 (1976).
See notes 61-63 & accompanying text supra.
', Dr. Hilliard Cohen, one of the physicians who evaluated Horowitz in her appeal within
the medical school and a doctor responsible for hiring physicians for the Kansas City
Veterans' Administration, testified before the Court of Appeals that if two people were
applying to him for such a position, with "otherwise ... equal qualifications, roughly, I would
lean heavily to the other person who was not dismissed from a graduate school." Horowitz
v. Board of Curators, 538 F.2d 1317, 1320 n.3 (8th Cir. 1976).
And as Professor Buss observed:
Even damaging grounds of employment termination do not ... lead automatical-
ly to the curtailment of future employment. The terminated employee may
... at the time of application ... give his or her version of what happened.
For various reasons, the new employer might decide to hire despite the blemish
on the applicant's record. But no such option is available to one who seeks employ-
ment that requires a particular professional degree. Established professional stan-
dards, rules and often laws, make the degree an absolute condition precedent to
employment in some instances.
Buss, supra note 81, at 34-35 (emphasis added). Buss goes on to note the effects of the
dismissal on Horowitz' once-promising medical career. Id. at 35. At last word, she was
unemployed and had been rejected by all the medical schools to which she had applied after
her dismissal. Brief for Respondent, supra note 1, at 9-10.
It is ... naive ... to believe that the information that is stigmatizing is not
available to those who would need it most, particularly when a student wishes
to either continue his or her medical education in another school or obtain
employment in a related field. The undisputed evidence at the trial indicated
that Horowitz's own medical school required in its application for admittance
a disclosure of the reasons why a potential student left a college, graduate,
or professional school. Obviously, public disclosure would be at the discretion
of the student, but in order to obtain employment in a related field or con-
tinue her medical education, the student would have no alternative but to either
disclose her previous dismissal or lie on the application. Such a disclosure would
either eliminate or, at the very least, dampen any chances of ever attending
another medical school.
Comment, supra note 78, at 887. For evidence that elimination is a much more likely result
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tial" stigma required for damage to a liberty interest so that procedural
protection is essential to enable students to challenge the validity of such
actions.'
Finally, the importance of student status89 has been recognized in the
decisions requiring due process in disciplinary dismissals." Indeed, the
than "dampening," see Horowitz' experience, described above and in note 71 supra, and
the experience of the dental student described in Jensen v. Emory Univ., 440 F. Supp. 1060,
1062 (N.D. Ga. 1977), who was dismissed from dental school and then rejected in his at-
tempts at admission by every dental school in the United States, Canada and Puerto Rico.
See also Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, supra note 35, at 1154.
In his concurring opinion in Horowitz, Justice Marshall explicitly noted that the interest
involved was a "weighty one," and quoted Judge Friendly's observation that "to deprive
a person of a way of life to which [s]he has devoted years of preparation and on which [slhe
... hafs] come to rely" should require a "high level of procedural protection." 435 U.S. at
100 (quoting Friendly, supra note 46, at 1296-97).
1 As the Horowitz case, and others like it, see, e.g., cases cited in notes 19-22 supra, in-
dicate all too clearly, dismissed students are seeking a mechanism by which to contest the
accuracy of the evaluations resulting in their expulsion; this inclination satisfies the Codd
v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977), requirement that due process challenges be brought for the
purpose of challenging the accuracy of the appraisal. Id. at 627-28. Even given Codd's rather
restrictive view of due process as directed toward ensuring accuracy in such decisions, stu-
dent challenges to academic evaluations qualify as an area in which this protection is war-
ranted; because such evaluations ineluctably impugn the student's capacities, such challenges,
as opposed to the one involved in Codd, always go to the justice of the action.
' Another approach to establishing a liberty interest is to argue that adverse academic
evaluations can "label" students in such a way as to effect an "alteration of legal status"
sufficient to require procedural protection. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708-09 (1976). The
status which is being altered is that prefatory status which individuals must occupy before
becoming professionals; the argument is that, at the graduate and professional school level,
at least, student status is the prerequisite for entering a given career. It is a prerequisite
because the states have elected to require educational credentials for entry into a variety
of professions; given that the state has chosen to define the requirements for such careers,
it follows that they represent statuses which are, at a minimum, recognized by state law.
In this sense, then, student status is an aspect, an inchoation, of the occupational status
which would enjoy protection as a liberty interest. Liberty "denotes ... the right of the
individual ... to engage in any of the common occupations of life." Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). See also Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S.
96, 102 (1963) (" 'A State cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or from any other
occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' "). Id. at 102 (quoting Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957)). For state involvement in degree and licensing re-
quirements, see Whitfield v. Board of Law Examiners, 504 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1974) (upholding
bar examinations as state requirement for practicing law); People v. Apfelbaum, 251 Ill.
18, 95 N.E. 995 (1911) (upholding requirement that professional degrees be granted only
by schools certified by state); Moore v. Board of Regents, 44 N.Y.2d 593, 378 N.E.2d 1022,
407 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1978) (upholding state registration, and denial of registration, to doctoral
degree programs); Institute of the Metropolis v. University of the State of N.Y., 159 Misc.
529, 289 N.Y.S. 660 (Sup. Ct. 1936) (upholding constitutionality of early New York statute
restricting granting of professional degrees to schools certified by state regents). For a
recent reaffirmation of state authority over bar requirements, see the discussion of a
challenge to the limitation on taking the bar examination in Lawyer Challenges Limit on
Retaking Bar Exams, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1980, 5 B, at 7, col. 1.
" See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294
F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961). The Goss Court noted: "Among other things, the State is con-
strained to recognize a student's legitimate entitlement to a public education as a property
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Horowitz opinion explicitly noted that the deprivation to which Horowitz
was subjected was even more severe than that involved in the Goss deci-
sion, which recognized protected property, and liberty, interests in stu-
dent status.9' The Supreme Court, in Horowitz, did not deny that academic
evaluations affect important interests: the basis for the decision92 was not
the absence of important constitutional interests but was, instead, the
presumed differences between academic and disciplinary actions: "Since
the issue first arose 50 years ago, state and lower federal courts have
recognized that there are distinct differences between decisions to sus-
pend or dismiss a student for disciplinary purposes and similar actions
taken for academic reasons."93 "This difference calls for far less stringent
procedural requirements in the case of an academic dismissal."94
Horowitz was, then, the product of the academic abstention doctrine;
what is interesting about that doctrine, and its utilization in Horowitz,
is that it is based on pragmatism, not on principle. Judicial noninterven-
tion in academic evaluations is not required by any body of legal doctrine;
it is, instead, based on the perception of judges as being incapable of mak-
ing the kind of "expert evaluation" necessary to determine the correct-
ness of the school's action.95 This presumed incapacity is considered to
result both from the lay judge's ignorance of the substantive issues in-
volved and from the fact that graduate education is essentially personal,
so that evaluations are of necessity subjective. 6
interest which is protected by the Due Process Clause and which may not be taken away
.. without adherence to the minimum procedures required by that Clause." 419 U.S. at
574. See generally Memorandum on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review
of Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D. 134 (1968);
W. KAPLIN, THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION 237-42 (1978).
Although Goss' facts concerned the suspension of high school students, the Supreme Court
sanctioned the Dixon doctrine that due process protection is also required for college and
university students; in Goss the Court identified two major interests of such students-a
property interest in education and a liberty interest in educational and employment oppor-
tunities and reputation. 419 U.S. at 576 & n.8.
" "We fully recognize that the deprivation to which respondent was subjected-dismissal
from a graduate medical school-was more severe than the 10-day suspension to which the
high school students were subjected in Goss." 435 U.S. at 86 n.3. See also 435 U.S. at 97,
100 (Marshall, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
12 One author described the ruling as "a decision comprised of dicta." Dessem, Board
of Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz: Academic Versus Judicial Expertise,
39 OHIO ST. L.J. 476, 477 (1978). For Dessem's development of the Horowitz decisional dicta,
see id. at 478-85.
' 435 U.S. at 87.
" Id. at 86. See also id. at 87-91.
'5 "Like the decision of an individual professor as to the proper grade for a student in
his course, the determination whether to dismiss a student for academic reasons requires
an expert evaluation of cumulative information and is not readily adapted to the procedural
tools of judicial or administrative decisionmaking." Id. at 90.
" "[Sichool authorities [are given] absolute discretion in determining whether a student
has been delinquent in his studies.... The reason for this rule is that in matters of scholar-
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Given the pragmatic rationale underlying academic abstention, there
are two (equally practical) alternatives for avoiding its consequences and
ensuring due process protection for students. One is to attack the assump-
tion that academic evaluations are too esoteric and subjective to be amen-
able to due process and judicial review. The Supreme Court's adherence
in Horowitz to the doctrine suggests, however, that this approach would
be less than promising.9" The other alternative is to work with Horowitz,
ship, the school authorities are uniquely qualified by training and experience to judge the
qualifications of a student ...." Connelly v. University of Vt., 244 F. Supp. 156, 160 (D. Vt.
1965). See also Dehaan v. Brandeis Univ., 150 F. Supp. 626, 627 (D. Mass. 1957); Edde v. Col-
umbia Univ., 8 Misc. 2d 795, 168 N.Y.S.2d 643 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
1 Academic abstention has not always been with us. Historically, courts did intervene
in academic affairs. See The King v. Chancellor, Masters, and Scholars, 92 Eng. Rep. 370,
370 (1723) ("A mandamus lies to restore a man to any academical degree to which temporal
advantages are annexed"); note 34 supra. However, for whatever reason, Barnard v. In-
habitants of Shelburne, 216 Mass. 19, 102 N.E. 1095 (1913), was destined to establish the
policy of nonintervention, at least in academic disputes.
It is this dichotomy between "factual" disciplinary disputes and "subjective" academic
disputes which is, logically, the weakest aspect of the policy. It is not denied (though seldom
expressly mentioned) that precisely the same interests are at stake in both types of pro-
ceedings. Given the equivalence of interests at stake, the legitimacy of academic absten-
tion depends upon the validity, and inevitability, of this distinction. It has, however, been
widely criticized. See, e.g., Dessem, supra note 92; LaMorte, supra note 7, at 208-10; Note,
Academic Dismissals: A Due Process Anomaly, 58 NEB. L. REv. 519, 540-43 (1979).
Certainly the most interesting criticism of the dichotomy is found in Justice Marshall's
concurring and dissenting opinion in Horowitz. 435 U.S. at 97-108. Justice Marshall discuss-
ed the distinction in part 3 of his opinion, concluding that characterizing disputes as
"academic" or "disciplinary" "does little to advance the due process inquiry." Id. at 103.
He examined in some detail the facts underlying Horowitz, and concluded that "a talismanic
reliance on labels should not be a substitute for sensitive consideration of the procedures
required by due process." Id. at 106. Justice Marshall felt that Horowitz' performance in
her clinical courses was sufficiently factual, "susceptible of determination by third parties,"
to warrant procedural protection. Id. Justice Marshall's position here is especially interesting
given that clinical experience is generally considered to be the most subjective, least fac-
tual area of student evaluations. See ABA COMMITTEE ON GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL LEGAL
EDUCATION, CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION (1980) [hereinafter cited as CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCA-
TION]; Carr, Grading Clinic Students, 26 J. LEGAL EDUC. 223 (1974); Note, supra, at 546-47.
For an interesting example of the confusion which arises in cases in which dismissals
are not clearly either academic or disciplinary, see Tedeschi v. Wagner College, 49 N.Y.2d
652, 404 N.E.2d 1302, 427 N.Y.S.2d 760 (1980). In Tedeschi a part-time student at a private
college was suspended for "academic and social problems:' Id. at 655-56, 404 N.E.2d at 1303,
427 N.Y.S.2d at 761-62. During her attendance at Wagner College Tedeschi was unprepared
and disruptive in class, tore up her examination before handing it in and harassed a pro-
fessor with threats. Id. at 657-58, 404 N.E.2d at 1304, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 762. She was suspended
by the university, a suspension which was challenged at the trial court and two appellate
levels. Id. at 657-58, 404 N.E.2d at 1304, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 762. What is interesting about
the case is the disagreement it provoked among the justices; in the Court of Appeals, for
example, the majority interpreted the dismissal as a nonacademic action requiring due proces
and amenable to judicial review. It, therefore, reversed the lower courts' decisions that
Tedeschi had not been entitled to a predismissal hearing, and ordered that she be reinstated
as a student unless such a hearing was provided. Id. at 658-63, 404 N.E.2d at 1304-07, 427
N.Y.S.2d at 762-66. The dissent, however, construed the dismissal otherwise: "I find ...
the majority's attempts to parse out a distinction between dismissal for academic
failure and dismissal for 'other reasons' are ... unavailing, since ... Ms. Tedeschi was plainly
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outlining a model of institutional due process which will ensure that other
students will receive "at least as much due process as the Fourteenth
Amendment requires."98 It is with this alternative that the remainder of
the note is concerned.
"DUE PROCESS BY CONSENT": 9 INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW OF
ACADEMIC DECISIONMAKING
Horowitz held that Horowitz received "at least as much due process"
as was required. ' The purpose of this section is to extrapolate from
Horowitz what is required in such situations and to outline a model of
review procedures which will satisfy that requirement. The model is, of
course, concerned with review within the educational institution, since this
is what was found to be satisfactory in Horowitz.10'
One reason why the Court may have limited the due process require-
ment to intra-institutional review could be that such review imposes the
least threatto academic freedom."2 Due process determinations require
balancing the individual's interest in procedural safeguards against any
countervailing state interests."°3 In the present context, the student's in-
suspended because of her inability to function in the academic setting .... Id. at 665, 404
N.E.2d at 1309, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 768 (Gabriell, J., dissenting). "Her suspension
... was not a 'disciplinary' measure in the traditional sense, but rather was a recognition
by the school officials that her continued attendance would be fruitless from an academic
standpoint." Id. at 665-66, 404 N.E.2d at 1310, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 768. (Gabriell, J. dissenting).
If nothing else, Tedeschi points out that the distinction between factual and substantive issues
is not so clear as the dichotomy seems to assume. A similar controversy arose in Gamble
v. University of Minn., 639 F.2d 452 (8th Cir. 1981), in which a dismissed medical student
alleged that her dismissal was the product of racial considerations; the Eighth Circuit upheld
the decision of a magistrate, below, that the dismissal was for nondiscriminatory academic
reasons. The case is interesting because it is reminiscent of some of the allegations in Horowitz
concerning discrimination. See Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 733-34.
One final criticism of the rationale proceeds from an analogy. Academic evaluations are
not encompassed within due process protection because they are "subjective and evaluative."
Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 90. However, the Supreme Court has recognized
the necessity for procedural protection in commitments to mental institutions. See Parkam
v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). It is difficult to under-
stand why due process is more impracticable in academia than in the more nebulous area
of mental competence. For a discussion of the subjectivity of psychiatric evaluations, see
B. ENNIS & R. EMERY, THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS 19-20 (1978); T. SZAsz, THE MANUFAC-
TURE OF MADNESS (1970).
" Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 85.
Dessem, supra, note 92, at 494. Dessem is referring to due process "pursuant to volun-
tarily adopted procedures," which he sees as the only realistic alternative given the Horowitz
decision's refusal to impose "due process by command." Id.
'® 435 U.S. at 85.
101 For a description of the University of Missouri-Kansas City Medical School procedures,
see 435 U.S. at 80-82; notes 3 & 4 supra.
' See Dessem, supra note 35, at 288.
103 See L. TRIBE, supra note 81, S 10-13; Note, Specifying theProceduresRequired byDuePro-
cess: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1510 (1975).
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terest in procedural fairness is to be balanced against considerations of
academic freedom.' The task at hand is, then, to establish "academic due
process" without impinging on academic freedom.115
Institutional "academic due process " is a minimal threat to academic
freedom. First, it obviates that lay intrusion into areas of scholarly in-
tegrity which has always been the primary evil associated with judicial
intervention.1 Intra-institutional review allows the student an opportunity
to present his side of the story and to receive a public explanation of the
action. It also ensures that the review will take place in a setting con-
genial to intellectual inquiry and conducted by those familiar with the
substantive issues.'07 Also, academic due process is logically distinguishable
from conventional threats to academic freedom; these typically involve
attempts to influence what is taught in the classroom."8 Academic due
process is, in contrast, a post hoc phenomenon: it does not attempt to dic-
tate what will be taught but, rather, only attempts to ensure that evalua-
tions will proceed according to the criteria and material presented. 9
Academic due process is not concerned with substantive issues but with
the process by which an evaluation was made; the utility of the review
lies in the fact that a description of the criteria employed helps to ensure
the objectivity of such evaluations.
While raising the spectre of a public examination of academic decisions
may have a chilling effect on the grading policies of some professors, con-
ducting the review within the institution will confine that effect to a
minimum. Academic review procedures analogous to those already
employed in disciplinary actions can be established. Judicial review of the
operation of those procedures would then be available, just as it is in
", See notes 25-28 & accompanying text supra. Academic freedom is, again, considered
to be a sufficiently important state interest to warrant the balance being weighted heavily
in its favor. See Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 90 (1978).
"I It is generally recognized that professorial academic freedom is not an absolute. See
Kutner, The Freedom ofAcademic Freedom: A Legal Dilemma, 48 0HI.-KENT L. REV. 168,169,
185-89 (1971). There also exists some impetus toward recognition of a cognate concept for
students. See Van Alstyne, The Judicial Trend Toward Student Academic Freedom, 20 U.
FLA. L. REV. 290 (1968).
106 See AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 2, 61-62 (1973); notes 25-26 supra.
"' For a discussion of the functions of such a procedure, see Board of Curators v. Horowitz,
435'U.S. 78, 99-103 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part); note 17 supra.
See also LaMorte, supra note 7, at 209. For a quite contrary view of the effect of institutional
review upon academic freedom, see Letter by C. Ronald Chester in HARPER'S, July, 1980,
at 6 (Chester's perspective on faculty re-evaluation of his grades in two law courses is sug-
gested by his phrase "[wjith the tie between student and professor severed, and academic
freedom violated ... ").
Il See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1972); Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928, 929-30
(7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972 (1973); AAUP DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES (1915),
reprinted in ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE, supra note 27, at 161-74.
1' For a recognition of the value of explicitly prescribed evaluative criteria in student
perceptions of evaluation fairness, see CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 97, at 104.
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disciplinary actions. Such a solution would combine maximum procedural
fairness with a minimal burden on the institution.
Procedures
Although academic review procedures can resemble disciplinary
procedures,110 they cannot be identical because of the complexity and sen-
sitivity of the issues involved in the former. It becomes necessary, then,
to model procedures which achieve the same ends while respecting
substantive dissimilarities.
Disciplinary due process requires that students be given notice of the
charges against them, an explanation of those charges and the evidence
behind them, and an opportunity to present their side of the story."' These
requirements need not take place within the context of a formal, adver-
sarial hearing; what is required is "an informal give-and-take" between
student and faculty."' In Horowitz, the student was given notice of her
deficiencies and their implications, and warned whenever her situation
advanced to a new probationary plateau."' This satisfied the first two
requirements -notice and explanation-and suggests that, given the
Court's sanctioning these procedures, these elements should be incor-
porated into the model." 4 The most interesting requirement is, however,
the one which was not included: the opportunity to present one's own side
of the story."1 5 This was included in the requirements established in Goss
v. Lopez"6 because it served as a check on erroneous action, a traditional
function of due process."7
"I For an excellent discussion of disciplinary due process and some procedures required
for it, see Buss, Procedural Due Process for School Discipline. Probing the Constitutional Outline,
119 U. PA. L. REV. 545, 567-639 (1971). For a specific description of disciplinary procedures
currently in use, see INDIANA UNIVERSITY, STATEMENT OF STUDENT RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
AND DIRECTORY OF STUDENT SERVICES 4-9 (1978-1979).
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975).
112 d. at 583-84. "[Requiring effective notice and informal hearing permitting the student
to give his version of the events will provide a meaningful hedge against erroneous action.
... [The student will at least have the opportunity to characterize his conduct and put
it in what he deems the proper context." Id. For a recent discussion of disciplinary pro-
cedural requirements, including the right to confrontation and cross-examination, see Aguirre
v. San Bernardino City Unified School Dist., 113 Cal. 3d 380, - P.2d - , 170 Cal. Rptr.
206 (1980).
1 See Brief for Respondent, supra note 1, at 3-7; note 3 supra.
"' "The school fully informed respondent of the faculty's dissatisfaction with her clinical
progress and the danger that this posed to timely graduation and continued enrollment.
The ultimate decision to dismiss respondent was careful and deliberate. These procedures
were sufficient .... 435 U.S. at 85.
15 This was a major argument advanced by Horowitz in challenging her dismissal. See
Brief for Respondent, supra note 1, at 3, 8-9, 36-37.
116 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
", See 419 U.S. at 583-84; note 112 supra. The most interesting development in this con-
text is the recent West Virginia case, Evans v. West Va. Bd. of Regents, - W. Va. _,
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The Court's declining to require this opportunity in Horowitz seems to
have been the result of two factors: first, the earlier-discussed concern
that "some type of formal hearing" would jeopardize the educational
process;' and second, the implicit consideration that the procedures in
Horowitz were sufficiently redundant to ensure accuracy in
decisionmaking."9 This seems to indicate, again, a pragmatic approach to
academic evaluations; a hearing is not required in this context because
of the Court's reluctance to "further enlarge the judicial presence in the
academic community" given the limited utility of that enlargement and
the preferability of other alternatives. 120 Despite the fact that the Court
271 S.E.2d 778 (1980). See note 80 supra. This is noteworthy (and encouraging to advocates
of academic due process) for two reasons: first, the court found a property interest in stu-
dent status, and second, the court indicated that before the school could terminate that status
it must provide the student with the following due process protections:
(1) a formal written notice of the reasons he should not be permitted to con-
tinue his medical education; (2) a sufficient opportunity to prepare a defense
to the charges; (3) an opportunity to have retained counsel at any hearings on
the charges; (4) a right to confront his accusers and present evidence on his
own behalf; (5) an unbiased hearing tribunal; and (6) an adequate record of the
proceedings.
Id. at -, 271 S.E.2d at 781. The Evans court went beyond the protections afforded by
the model, see text accompanying notes 121-33 infra, and even beyond the apparent re-
quirements of Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). See text accompanying note 111 supra.
The exact implications of the Evans decision remain unclear; what is clear, however, is that-
the decision is entirely consistent with the reasoning presented in this note: the court found
a property interest in student tenure based on the Roth "existing rules or understandings"
discussed above, see notes 77-79 & accompanying text supra, and the court indicated that
institutional due process was required for termination of that interest. - W. Va. at .
271 S.E.2d at 781. The procedural model presented in this note satisfies Evans requirements
1, 2, 4, 5 and 6; it does not incorporate representation by counsel because this arguably
interjects a nonacademic element into an academic proceeding. See note 127 infra. In sum,
Evans provides an interesting confirmation of the premises of this note.
It may quite reasonably be conjectured that the recent predilection for finding a property
interest in student status stems from the fact that Horowitz only alleged a liberty interest
at stake in her action; while the Supreme Court indicated that it did not reach the issue
either of a liberty or property interest, 435 U.S. at 84-85, it seems likely that a property
interest is perceived as a more viable alternative given whatever tacit onus has attached
to the liberty concept in the wake of Horowitz' ignominious failure. Also, a property interest
is the more likely alternative given the recent erosion of the liberty concept. See notes 60-62
& accompanying text supra.
... 435 U.S. at 89-90; See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra.
1' This second factor emerges from several comments in the Court's opinion. One is the
observation that the "ultimate decision ... was careful and deliberate." Id. at 85; see note
114 supra. Also, the Court's citing with approval a passage of the district court opinion con-
cerning the independent evaluation by local physicians indicates that it was impressed with
the care taken by the medical faculty "'to be absolutely certain that their grading of the
[respondent] in her medical skills was correct.'" 435 U.S. at 85. See also id. at 89-90 (discus-
sion of academic versus disciplinary dismissals).
"2 For the limited utility of such measures, see 435 U.S. at 89-90. One could, perhaps unkind-
ly, analogize the Horowitz Court's concern with the effects of judicial intrusion into academics
to Justice Black's pessimistic observations on the effects of the decision in Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), prohibiting suspensions of students
wearing armbands in protest of the Vietnam war:
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found the University of Missouri-Kansas City Medical School alternative
acceptable, procedures which incorporate some student participation in
evaluation review have the advantage of maximizing student satisfaction
with outcomes while maintaining the checks on accuracy built into the
medical schoors model; since this occurs within the university, it eliminates
the outside interference which was the Court's concern."' The following
procedures were developed with the aid of some reference to academic
review procedures employed in English universities."=
The exact procedural sequence would have to depend on the type of
evaluation being challenged. If a student were dissatisfied with his grade
Turned loose with lawsuits ... against their teachers as they are here, it is
nothing but wishful thinking to imagine that young, immature students will
not soon believe it is their right to control the schools rather than the right
of the States ... to hire the teachers for the benefit of the pupils.
Id. at 525.
Justice Marshall agreed with the majority in Horowitz that the due process provided was
sufficient; however, he based his agreement on his understanding that the procedures pro-
vided all three Goss requirements. See 435 U.S. at 99 (Marshall, J., concurring in part &
dissenting in part).
II 435 U.S. at 89-91.
'' For two cases discussing British academic review procedures, see Regina v. Universi-
ty of Ashton, [1969] 2 Q.B. 538; Herring v. Templeman, [1973] 3 All E.R. 569 (C.A.). Universi-
ty ofAshton was an appeal by two students who were dismissed upon the recommendation
of the university senate, "the supreme academic authority in the institution." [1969] 2 Q.B.
at 543. Their argument was that the dismissal contravened their procedural rights since
it took into account extraneous personal factors and since neither was allowed to be present
and argue in his defense. The court held that since the students had so much at stake and
since they were not given a chance to defend themselves, the decision was improper. Id.
at 554. Herring involved a student who was dismissed from school for failure in his practice
teaching program; this was a clinical requirement, and he was dismissed after the governing
academic board and an "external assessor" found that the student's personal qualities were
such as to prevent his ever becoming a successful teacher. [1973] 3 All E.R. at 576. The
cases illustrate the procedures usually followed in academic evaluations: there are student
and faculty bodies which participate in school governance generally; all academic evalua-
tions are made as recommendations by faculty members to an academic board composed
of students and faculty; the academic board reviews these recommendations, may conduct
its own inquiries, and makes a final recommendation. This is, in turn, reviewed by a commit-
tee composed of faculty and school administrators. Students have the power to appeal ex-
pulsion, suspension or probation to a university senate, which has a broader representation
among students and faculty than does the academic board.
One difference between British and American universities is the status of students within
the institution. In Great Britain, students are considered to be members of the university
and have a recognized legal status within it:
"Whatever they may be in the United States ... , British students are in law
and in fact members of. the university just as much as teachers or governors
or graduates are." It has always been the essence of the British University
system that on matriculation into a university the student becomes a member
of it, that he immediately acquires legal status within it and is invested with
certain legal rights and corresponding obligations....
J. SCOTT. DONS AND STUDENTS 124-25 (1973) (quoting Scott, Student Teacher Relations in
UNIVERSITY INDEPENDENCE (1971)). Arguably, the procedural protections accorded British
students derive from this recognition of "student" as a legal status, the British analogue
to a property or liberty interest; this recognition is perhaps the major distinction between
the two systems.
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in a particular course, he would initiate his challenge by having a con-
ference with his instructor. If this proved unsatisfactory he could then
proceed to an intermediate alternative, most probably review by a student-
faculty committee drawn from within the department or school. Both these
alternatives would be informal, and both would be available at the request
of the student. '
Should these procedures fail to resolve the problem, the next step would
be referral to an academic board. This would be composed primarily of
students and faculty from within the same department or school; it would,
however, include a minority of "outsiders," students and faculty from other
departments. While remaining informal, proceedings before this board
would include presentation of evidence and arguments by each side, and
members of the board would be allowed to examine the parties and any
witnesses. Qualifying for a board hearing would mean satisfying two re-
quirements, one substantive and one procedural.
Substantively, the student would have to show a meaningful cause of
action. This would require establishing that he suffered some significant
degree of harm from the evaluation; disputes over minor grade differences
would be disqualified as frivolous.124 "Significant harm" would entail pro-
ving either a great disparity between the grade received and the grade
claimed, or that the difference was of sufficient import to alter the stu-
dent's academic standing."I Procedurally, qualifying for a board hearing
'" This is in contrast to the present state of affairs: "It would appear that a student is
not entitled to procedural safeguards if failing grades are erroneously calculated by an in-
competent professor. Assignment of grades is left strictly to the professor.., unless the
student can show arbitrariness." Note, supra note 79, at 120 n.50. Arbitary or capricious
grading will, of course, result in judicial review; for some issues involved in demonstrating
that an action was arbitrary or capricious, and not merely "a difference of opinion," see
Purver, Arbitrary or Capricious Grading of Student, 19 P.O.F.2d 649-80 (1979).
For an empirical investigation of the frequency of error in grading, see Wood, The Measure-
ment of Law School Work, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 224 (1924). For a discussion of the divergences
in evaluation between professors, see Grant, Justice in Grading, 9 J. LEGAL EDUC. 186 (1956).
See generally Grant, The Single Standard in Grading, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 920 (1929). The
availability of internal procedures for review of grades was examined in 1955 and reported
in Spies, Examination Review, Dismissal, and Readmission: Some Specific Practices, 9 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 473 (1957). Spies' poll was replicated recently, and the results described in Doniger,
supra note 26, at 748-56. Spies found that review procedures were available on a very limited
scale; and the 1976 replication found that, with 48 law schools responding, less than 30%
provided any independent review of grades. Id. at 754-56.
12 Such differences would be denied access to this procedural level; their resolution would
have to be effected, if at all, at the lower levels. Presumably, the student-faculty committee
representing the second stage of a challenge would have discretionary authority to consider,
or refuse to consider, such "marginal" claims.
'" These are logically distinct: the former instance requires a great disparity for its prima
facie case; the latter takes into account the situation of the student, so that less dramatic
disparities could be considered. A tangential consideration here would be the student's ability
to demonstrate that the evaluation was not made in accordance with announced criteria;
demonstration of this type of inconsistency would be an additional factor in assessing the
merits of the complaint and the remedy warranted. (Indeed, instances such as this could
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would require either that the departmental committee vote to refer the
matter to the board, or that it was unable to reach a consensus for recom-
mending any action, so that the matter is "kicked upstairs" by default.2 '
Disputes over broader actions such as dismissal, probation or suspen-
sion would proceed immediately to the academic board. In these hearings,
the parties would be the student and the academic agent recommending
that the action be taken. Each side would be allowed to present evidence
and arguments and to cross-examine witnesses; conduct of this proceeding
would remain, however, informal."9 The scope of the inquiry would have
to be determined at the time the procedures were established. The
primary issue in designing such procedures is how far afield the inquiry
should go." In some American military academies, review boards are
allowed to take into account such "extraneous" factors as the student's
personal life and educational background." Other schools confine review
to a consideration of the academic record.3 '
give rise to a form of institutional class action in which all the members of a particular class
could jointly challenge their evaluations. For a reaction to an ad hoc solution to such a situa-
tion, see Letter from C. Ronald Chester, supra note 107, at 6).
"I For an unusual example of a review of an examination grade which resulted in the
original grade being changed to a passing one, see Goldberg v. Board of Regents, - Colo.
App. - 603 P.2d 974 (1979).
One alternative for restricting the multiplication of such challenges would be to allow
each student a specific number of challenges, like restrictions on peremptory challenges
in voir dire examinations. For example, students could be allowed one challenge for each
year of their program so that a three-year program would permit three challenges. The
advantage of this tactic is that it places a great deal of discretion in the hands of students
and, thereby, shifts some of the burden for eliminating frivolous challenges away from the
formal review structure: with a limited number of challenges available, students would be
hesitant to "waste" one on a frivolous cause. Rules could also restrict the number of challenges
which could be brought within a specified time period to prevent students from using all
their challenges in their last semester.
I" Given the Horowitz Court's concern with avoiding outside interference into academic
affairs, the proceeding would necessarily be informal and would not include outside counsel.
Even Goss, of course, did not require formalities such as counsel. See 419 U.S. at 583. For
some comments concerning the utility of internal review agencies such as the one discussed
above in areas of "academic expertise," see Dessem, supra note 35, at 288-90.
I" See, e.g., Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1972); Regina v. University of
Ashton, [1969] 2 Q.B. 538. At the English university involved in the latter case, students
are allowed to present evidence in any action involving their student status, even if subjec-
tive evaluations are involved. As the court noted in Herring v. Templeman, [1973] 3 All
E.R. 569 (C.A.), "such a hearing ... is neither a law suit nor a legal arbitration.... The
purpose is to give the student a fair chance to show why the recommendations should not
be accepted." Id. at 587.
In See, e.g., Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1972). Students at West Point
are allowed to present evidence of "extraneous factors" which may explain why they are
experiencing academic difficulties. Id. at 211.
130 For an interesting discussion of the Horowitz case as one in which "behavioral and
academic bases for expulsion [were] inextricably intertwined," see Rosenberg, supra note
3, at 733-45. Rosenberg points out the complex role such "extraneous factors" played in this
case and raises some interesting issues regarding the demarcation of "academic" issues in
graduate and professional schools.
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Like procedures, remedies vary with the issue and with the level of
review. In grade challenges the professor could elect to alter the grade,
allow the student to repeat his performance and be re-graded, assign ex-
tra work for extra credit, or let the grade stand. The review committee
could not change the grade if the professor were opposed; its primary role
would be to effect a compromise between the two parties. This could take
one of the forms described above, or the committee could permit the stu-
dent to re-take the course from another instructor. The academic board
could choose from among any of these alternatives and could also alter
the grade over the professor's protests. Presumably, however, the latter
course would be a drastic, seldom-used option restricted to instances of
demonstrable bad faith, mistake, or "plain error."'13 In disputes over a stu-
dent's retention the board could approve the recommended action, modify
it to allow the student to remain conditionally, or reverse the decision
entirely.132
Decisions of the academic board of each department and school would
be reviewable by an appeal board composed of. faculty and students from
the university at large. The appeal board's role would be to examine the
"regularity" of the proceedings below, not in terms of a review of an of-
ficial record of those proceedings but in a general way to ensure that the
appellant was granted a fair and impartial hearing. It would concentrate
on the procedures followed and would not substantively review the
evidence beyond ensuring that there was present at least a "scintilla" of
evidence for the conclusion.
131 One difficult problem to be resolved in this context is the extent to which grades can
be reviewed, and altered, because they are based on an intellectual "difference of opinion"
between student and instructor. In the past, courts have refused to review such disputes.
See Purver, supra note 123, at 656-57. The extent to which an institutional review board
would consider such issues would have to be addressed at the outset. This is a particularly
ubiquitous problem in graduate schools, in which students are encouraged to work independent-
ly; one not terribly satisfactory solution could be to prepare a departmental policy state-
ment as to the extent to which such controversies would be considered, with suggestions
for averting them.
" One goal of this remedial scheme is to establish what is, in effect, an "equitable"
mechanism to prevent "categorical" outcomes such as that in Horowitz:
Maybe Horowitz was the proverbial hard case that decided any other way would
have made bad law. Nevertheless, I cannot quite escape the uneasy feeling that
there might have been a better solution. Maybe Ms. Horowitz gave no promise
of becoming properly qualified to practice medicine, but that career was the
farthest thing from her desires. She wanted to do medical research ... and
... had already been promised a position. Yet the requisite qualifications for
the job included a medical degree. Somewhere the system seems to have gone
askew. Either the job's qualifications should be changed, or she should get a
degree that would qualify her for medical research but not for medical practice.
Nathanson, From Dr. Bonham to Ms. Horowitz: Fair Hearing in Historical Perspective, 16
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 295,299 (1979). Hopefully, procedures such as those described above could
effectuate a compromise which would avoid the unfortunate aspects of Horowitz commented
upon by Professor Nathanson.
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Finally, students who could show that all this failed to provide them
with due process could obtain judicial review of their allegations; this
would require a showing of serious imperfections in notice, in the hear-
ing, or a showing of bias. This latter subsumes the concerns presently
involved in review for arbitrariness or bad faith. If the court found a fatal
defect in the process provided it could either send the case back for a
rehearing at the institutional level or order relief, such as reinstatement
of a student" or damages."
Reflections on "The Protection Given a Pickpocket"'"
Procedures such as these would not jeopardize academic freedom. They
would not interfere with the teaching process; professors would remain
in control of their classrooms.'38 The only novelty would be an occasional
request to "document" a particular evaluation. This "documentation" would
require demonstrating the reasonableness of an assessment given the
quality of a student's work and the class norm. It would not encompass
broad substantive issues or instructional methods.' In the same vein,
review of general academic decisions, such as dismissal, would focus on
the student's performance in the context of the norm for that discipline.
Both types of inquiry would concentrate on the student's work and only
tangentially address substantive issues. The emphasis on examining the
133 These features are similar to those ordered in Maitland v. Wayne State Univ. Medical
School, 76 Mich. App. 631,-257 N.W.2d 195 (1977).
13 See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (damages awarded to expelled and reinstated
student).
'35 Seavey, supra note 32, at 1407.
"' For the general theoretical model from which these procedures were drawn, see Verkuil,
A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 739 (1976).
What this model achieves is "discretionary justice" in graduate education:
The task ... is to reconcile the need for administrative discretion with the
ethical and legal principal that discretion be exercised justly.... Specifically,
the task is limiting the scope and exercise of discretion in such a way as to
preserve administrative flexibility while at the same time creating safeguards
to protect the individual against arbitrariness and injustice.
Manley-Casimir, School Governance as Discretionary Justice, 82 U. CHI. SCH. REV. 347, 349
(1974).
I" A logical result of institution of procedures such as these would be that the faculty
in graduate and professional schools would find it advisable to establish some general guidelines
for grading policies. It would probably also be advisable for each professor to make clear,
at the outset of each course, what his grading policies were, what his requirements were
and what he expected to achieve in that course in terms of material to be covered. Similar
standards would have to be established for clinical programs, and students would have to
be made aware in advance of the criteria they would be expected to meet. The effect of
innovations such as these would be to put students on notice as to what was required of
them; professors facing student challenges of their evaluations could then refer back to these
enunciated requirements in explaining why a particular grade was given. For a discussion
of the importance of objective criteria in clinical evaluations, see CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCA-
TION, supra note 97, at 29, 104, 244.
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student's performance in the context of his peers' performances minimizes
the intrusion into intellectual issues by stressing the specificity of the
inquiry."
Inroads into academic freedom are further reduced by confining substan-
tive review, however slight, within the department or school from which
both the decision and the performance emanated. In grade disputes, while
other faculty and students may not have been present in the classroom
which produced the controversy, they should be familiar enough with the
subject matter to intelligently ascertain the appropriateness of the evalua-
tion. Similarly, in reviewing dismissals or suspensions, members of that
academic community should be able to make a reasonable assessment of
the necessity of the action. Once the departmental committee has spoken,
however, substantive review stops; extra-departmental review is limited
to the propriety of the procedures followed and a minimal scrutiny of the
evidence.
Because subsequent review is confined to examining the procedures
used, another objection to academic due process is avoided. This is the
argument that allowing academic decisions to be challenged would
hopelessly mire the courts in "subjective and evaluative" issues. The vir-
tue of this model is that substantive review would be confined within the
academic environment; judges would be required only to pass on the in-
tegrity of the procedures made available to the complainant. Also, because
review proceeds in stages, with the first three stages remaining within
the institution, this model has the additional serendipitous effect of
minimizing the impact on the judicial system. Some critics have argued
against academic due process on the grounds that the courts would soon
be swamped with complaining students;139 this model averts such a
calamity.
CONCLUSION
"Academic abstention" is the policy which accords procedural due pro-
cess to students in disciplinary actions and denies it in academic actions.
The denial is rationalized as necessary because academic decisions are too
subjective for an independent review to be meaningful and because in-
terfering in such decisions would imperil academic freedom.
I The advantage of a proposal such as this is that it utilizes existing resources, especially
personnel. Faculty-student conferences would not add a significant burden to professors'
lives; the student-faculty committee could meet whenever necessary. Although there might
be a flurry of challenges when this process is initiated, once the validity and sustainability
of evaluations are demonstrated, challenges should become more extraordinary, so that the
committee members should not be unduly busy. Also, the academic board could schedule
regular meetings to hear whatever cases might come before it, or it could arrange a docket
to reflect the periodicity of challenges (concentrated at the end of terms, no doubt).
I" See, e.g., Brief of Petitioners, supra note 2, at 21; Buss, supra note 81, at 12-13.
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This note has challenged academic abstention by demonstrating that
academic decisions implicate interests qualifying for due process protec-
tion, and that protection for these interests can be secured through in-
stitutional review procedures. The model procedures described featured
an informal review sequence progressing from a student-professor con-
ference to an academic board hearing with adversarial arguments and
presentation of evidence by each party.
Such procedures permit a reliable assessment of academic evaluations;
since substantive review is confined within the department or school,
reviewers are familiar with the subject matter and with typical evalua-
tion standards. Therefore, a meaningful comparison across cases is possi-
ble to elicit the accuracy of a challenged assessment. Further, the
reviewers' allegiance to their discipline, and their sensitivity to its idiosyn-
crasies, should ensure that there will be no massive incursions into
academic freedom.
The only involvement of the judicial system in this process would oc-
cur on those occasions when a student could tenably argue that institu-
tional review of his complaint was defective; in such instances courts could
inquire into the adequacy of the process provided, just as they do cur-
rently in disciplinary actions. If it were found to be deficient the case could
either be remanded for a proper institutional hearing or other relief could
be ordered.
This note has shown that academic decisions do not have to be left to
the discretion of school officials; academic due process and academic
freedom can coexist successfully.
SUE WOOLF BRENNER
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